The law created by state A and state B has the same legal value as that created by state C and state D. International law is a law of cooperation, not subordination. 6 Its creation depends essentially on the consent of states, be it explicit or only implicit. The lack of consent by a given state generally means that it cannot be held to the rule in question (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). 7 As a result, since each state is largely its own lawmaker, the legal relationship between states varies enormously depending on the states concerned (much more than the relationship between individuals under domestic law where legislation and other generally applicable law largely outweigh private contracts).
Although international law does not have a central legislator-and is essentially a compilation of varying bilateral legal relationships (even if these relationships are increasingly effected by multilateral treaties)-international law does include an element with features of international legislation, namely general international law, composed of general customary international law and general principles of law. The rules of general international law, in principle, are binding on all states. Each new state, as well as each new treaty, is automatically born into it. General international law fills the gaps left by treaties. More important, being composed largely of rules on the law of treaties, state responsibility, the interplay of norms, and the settlement of disputes, general international law ensures the existence of international law as a legal system. General international law is not limited, however, to these "secondary" rules of law, as they might be called (or a "toolbox" for the creation, operation, interplay, and enforcement of other rules of law). It also includes "primary" rules of law directly imposing rights and obligations on states (which "secondary" rules impose only indirectly through other rules of law), such as customary law and general principles of law on the use of force, genocide, and human rights. 8 Looked at from this angle, general international law does resemble domestic legislation (or even domestic constitutions). 9 In contrast, however, to much domestic legislation (and all domestic constitutions), general international law does not have an inherent legal value that is superior to other rules of law (subfederal law, administrative regulations, and contracts in domestic law; treaties in international law). 10 On the contrary, general customary international law and general principles of law are often characterized as vague, whereas treaties are much more explicit. The lack of any inherent hierarchy between general international law and treaties-as well as, more generally, between any two rules of international law-is explained on the ground that both derive, in one way or another, from the will or acquiescence of states. As they derive from the same source (essentially state consent), they must in principle be equal in value.
A prominent (but still disputed 11 ) exception to this absence of hierarchy in international law is rules of jus cogens. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, rules of jus cogens (by their very nature, part of general international law) prevail over all, past and future, treaty norms. 12 One further exception can be found: the rules created by different organs of the same international organization often have an inherent hierarchical status corresponding to the hierarchical status of the organ that made the rule.
This general lack of hierarchy in international law has major consequences. First, by concluding a treaty, states can contract out of or deviate from general international law (other than jus cogens). States do so regularly, 13 for example, in the final provisions of treaties on how to amend the treaty (thus contracting out of rules of general international law on the law of treaties 14 ) and in treaty provisions setting up a tailor-made enforcement mechanism (thus deviating from certain rules of general international law on state responsibility 15 ). Importantly, unless the treaty contracts out of a rule of general international law, this rule is valid and also applies with respect to the newly concluded treaty. 16 As noted earlier, each new state, as well as each new treaty, is automatically born into general international law. The treaty must exclude the rules of general international law that the parties do not want to apply with respect to the treaty, not the reverse (i.e., the treaty does not have to list all such rules that are to apply to it). Just as private contracts are automatically born into a system of domestic law, so treaties are automatically born into the system of international law. Much the way private contracts do not need to list all the relevant legislative and administrative provisions of domestic law for them to be applicable to the contract, so treaties need not explicitly set out rules of general international law for them to be applicable to the treaty (for example, the text of the Vienna Convention does not have to be attached to the new treaty for general international law rules on the law of treaties to be applicable to it). The same applies as regards existing treaties: any new treaty not only is subsumed under general international law, but is created within the wider corpus of public international law, including preexisting treaties. These preexisting treaties, insofar as they relate to the new treaty, automatically interact with it.
Second, since treaty rules and rules of customary law have the same binding force 17 and the notion of acte contraire is alien to international law, 18 not only can treaties contract out of, or overrule custom (custom being the main source of general international law), but also custom, in principle, can replace a treaty norm. Once a custom has been validly established and proven, an earlier contradictory treaty rule must give way to it unless it can be proved that the earlier treaty continues to apply as lex specialis. 19 In practice, this continuing existence is often manifest.
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[Vol. 95:535 20 See text at note 64 infra. 21 See also Vienna Convention, supra note 7, Arts. 41, 59. 22 E.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982 28 "WTO treaty" is used here to denominate the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 33 ILM at 1125 (1994) (which includes not only the WTO Agreement with its four annexes, but also a series of ministerial declarations and decisions). 29 Compare, for example, the WTO treaty to the LOS Convention, supra note 23, an equally broad and universal regulatory treaty that carefully regulates its relationship with other rules of international law in Article 311 (containing no less than six paragraphs).
Third, the absence of any inherent hierarchy of treaty norms (other than rules of jus cogens) means that, in principle, the treaty norms concluded under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have the same legal status as those concluded in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WTO, or a bilateral treaty. No a priori hierarchy exists between WTO rules and other treaty rules. All treaty rules derive from the consent of the states involved. Deriving from the same source, they must be equally binding in nature. Nevertheless, in practice, treaties themselves, 20 as well as general international law rules on the interaction between them (in particular, the lex posterior rule in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention 21 ), do set out rules on the priority of different treaty norms. In abstracto, however, one treaty norm, once validly concluded, is as legally binding as any other. As a result, in principle, any treaty norm existing today (other than a rule of jus cogens) can be changed tomorrow, as between any number of states and with the consent of these states, by another treaty norm. Only explicit prohibitions 22 or conflict rules in preexisting treaties, 23 and general international law rules on the interplay of norms, 24 can prevent states from thus "changing their minds."
WTO Rules as Rules of Public International Law
With one possible exception, no academic author (or any WTO decision or document) disputes that WTO rules are part of the wider corpus of public international law. 25 Like international environmental law and human rights law, WTO law is "just" a branch of public international law. To public international lawyers, my call in the April 2000 issue of this Journal for WTO rules to "be considered as creating international legal obligations that are part of public international law" 26 is a truism. 27 To many negotiators and other WTO experts in Geneva, however, it comes as a surprise. Not a single legal argument has been (or, in my view, can be) put forward in their support. The fact that many negotiators of the WTO treaty 28 (in numerous countries representatives of a trade ministry de-linked from that of foreign affairs) did not think of public international law when drafting the WTO treaty is not a valid legal argument. At most, it amounts to an excuse for the WTO treaty not to have dealt more explicitly with the relationship between WTO rules and other rules of international law. (1998) . Also, for practical purposes a workable treaty could not possibly be set up outside the system of international law, completely de-linked, for example, from the law of treaties and general principles of law. 32 See WTO Agreement Art. XII.1 and Explanatory Notes (defining the term "country"). Hereinafter, when the word "state" is used in the context of the WTO treaty, it should be read as including separate customs territories. 33 Stating that WTO rules are just a part of public international law is one thing. It is quite another to submit that there is nothing special about WTO rules. In many respects WTO rules are lex specialis as opposed to general international law. But contracting out of some rules of general international law (for example, as does the WTO dispute settlement mechanism vis-à-vis certain rules of general international law on state responsibility) does not mean that one has contracted out of all of them, nor a fortiori that WTO rules were created completely outside the system of international law. Much has been written about so-called self-contained regimes. 30 However, all references to this notion concerned certain international legal regimes (in particular, those of diplomatic immunities, the European Community, and human rights treaties) that, in terms of their compliance mechanism or secondary rules, may somehow be self-contained, without any or only limited "fallback" on general international law. No one has spoken of self-contained regimes in the sense of treaty regimes that are completely isolated from all rules of general international law (including the law on treaties, judicial proceedings, and matters such as the use of force and human rights), let alone treaty regimes concluded completely outside the international legal system. 31 As noted above, states, in their treaty relations, can contract out of one, more, or, in theory, all rules of general international law (other than those of jus cogens), but they cannot contract out of the system of international law. As soon as states contract with one another, they do so automatically and necessarily within the system of international law.
WTO rules are thus rules of international law that, in certain respects, constitute lex specialis vis-à-vis certain rules of general international law. However, this does not mean that WTO rules are lex specialis vis-à-vis all rules of international law. WTO of territorial borders. 35 Such resort creates a huge potential for interaction between WTO rules and other rules of international law, as WTO rules cut across almost all other rules of international law. It also means that in certain respects these "all-affecting" WTO rules are framework rules only or lex generalis. Indeed, the WTO forms a general and increasingly universal framework for all (or almost all) of the trade relations between states. Although GATT/WTO rules replaced a myriad of other bilateral and regional arrangements, they do allow for certain more detailed or further-reaching regional and bilateral arrangements, 36 as well as a series of exceptions related to the environment and national security, among other things. In these respects, WTO trade liberalization rules are general or lex generalis permitting the continuation or creation of more focused or detailed rules of international law (such as certain rules on the environment, human rights, or the law of the sea, as well as on customs unions and free trade areas). In this sense, WTO rules are not the alpha and omega of all possible trade relations between states. Other, more detailed or special rules of international law (in terms of either subject matter or the number of states bound by them) continue to be highly relevant.
The Relationship Between WTO Rules and Other Rules of International Law
With the preceding two sections in mind, we can now portray the universe of international law relevant to the WTO as consisting of the following:
(1) WTO rules 37 that add previously nonexistent rights or obligations to the corpus of international law (such as nondiscrimination principles in trade in services);
(2) WTO rules that contract out of general international law (such as rules in the Dispute Settlement Understanding on the "suspension of concessions," which contract out of general international law rules on countermeasures) or deviate from, or even replace, other preexisting rules of international law (such as bilateral quota or tariff arrangements 38 and the Tokyo Round codes); (3) WTO rules that confirm preexisting rules of international law, be they of general international law (such as DSU Article 3.2 confirming that WTO covered agreements are to be interpreted "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law") or preexisting treaty law (such as GATT 1994 42 This point applies only in respect of general international law. Indeed, to the extent that the WTO treaty confirmed and incorporates preexisting treaty rules, such as rules of certain WIPO conventions, WTO members not only confirmed their legal commitment to these rules (with some members agreeing to these rules for the first time), but also extended that commitment by subjecting these rules to the automatic and compulsory dispute settlement system of the WTO. See text at note 123 infra.
43 Accord García Rubio, supra note 27. 44 It is the treaty as a whole which is law. The treaty as a whole transcends any of its individual provisions or even the sum total of its provisions. For the treaty, once signed and ratified, is more than the expression of the intention of the parties. It is part of international law and must be interpreted against the general background of its rules and principles. 45 Chorzów Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13).
as certain rules in environmental or human rights conventions and customs unions or free trade arrangements); and (5) non-WTO rules that are created subsequently to the WTO treaty (post-April 1994) and (a) are relevant to and may have an impact on WTO rules; (b) either add to or confirm existing WTO rules or contract out of, deviate from, or replace aspects of existing WTO rules; and (c) if the latter is the case, do so in a manner consistent with interplay and conflict rules in the WTO treaty and general international law.
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Confirming some rules of general international law does not amount to excluding all others. A trap to be avoided with respect to the third category of rules outlined above (but one often fallen into by authors and WTO negotiators alike 41 ) is to take the explicit confirmation of some preexisting rules of international law in the WTO treaty (such as DSU Article 3.2 confirming customary international law rules on interpretation) as proof that the treaty has contracted out of all other rules of international law (pursuant to the adage expressio unius est exclusio alterius). As already noted, rather than explicitly confirm (or make a renvoi to) preexisting rules of general international law for those rules to apply to it, the WTO treaty had to exclude those rules that were not to apply. As a result, any explicit confirmation of rules of general international law in the WTO treaty must be seen as made ex abundante cautela.
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The absence of explicit contracting out must be regarded as a continuation or implicit acceptance of the rules in question. 43 As one early source put it: "Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of international law for all questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and in a different way." 44 Both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) later confirmed this line of thinking. In the Chorzów Factory case, the PCIJ confirmed it in respect of the obligation to make reparation for a breach of international law: "Reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself." It is, indeed, "a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation."
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The ICJ has made similar statements with respect to rules on treaty termination for breach and exhaustion of local remedies. In the 1971 South West Africa Advisory Opinion, the ICJ confirmed the right of termination of a treaty for breach (in casu, the mandate for South West Africa) and found that, for this right not to be applicable to the mandate, it would be necessary to show that the mandates system . . . excluded the application of the general principle of law that a right of termination on account of breach must be presumed to exist in respect of all treaties . . . . of such a right cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion of a right which has its source outside of the treaty, in general international law. . . .
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In the ELSI case, the acting Chamber of the ICJ had no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of that treaty; or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the Chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so.
47
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has also confirmed this approach. 48 In international law, there is thus a presumption in favor of continuity or against conflict, in the sense that if a treaty does not contract out of a preexisting rule, that rule (being of the same inherent value as the new one 49 ) continues to exist. 50 Only if it can be shown that the new treaty does contradict or aim at contracting out of a rule of general international law will the preexisting rule be dis-applied with respect to the treaty in question. The extent to which such contracting out has occurred is a question of treaty interpretation.
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The most prominent WTO rule explicitly confirming rules of general international law, DSU Article 3.2, supports the main thesis of this article. Article 3.2 provides in relevant part that WTO covered agreements must be clarified "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 56 This horizontal relationship between a new treaty, say, the WTO treaty, and other international law (and how the two interact) is to be distinguished from the vertical relationship between national law and international law (as well as the debated effect international law has in domestic legal systems). WTO and other rules of international law are part of one and the same legal system, which is public international law (unless one disputes that WTO law is international law). In contrast, national law and international law, even in countries upholding a monist view, remain in essence two separate legal systems with international law permeating national law only if certain conditions (on preciseness, unconditionality, etc.) are met. The language of 3.2 in this regard applies to a specific problem that had arisen under the GATT to the effect that, among other things, reliance on negotiating history was being utilized in a manner arguably inconsistent with the requirements of the rules of treaty interpretation of customary international law. 61 To be entirely correct, the panel should also have specified that only general customary international law applies as between all WTO members; not special or local customary law between certain WTO members only. treaty, account must be taken not only of the treaty itself (in casu, the WTO treaty), but also of "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." 55 However, besides international law rules on treaty interpretation, many other rules of general international law not explicitly confirmed in the WTO treaty must be applied with respect to the treaty; that is, as long as it does not contract out of these rules. In terms of the law of treaties, certain rules on the conclusion, invalidity, application, modification, suspension, or termination of treaties come to mind, but also rules on state responsibility, on judicial settlement of disputes, and on how to solve conflicts between norms must apply. 56 In terms of customary international law, this approach was confirmed in, for present purposes, a crucially important panel report (not appealed). The panel found as follows:
We take note that Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that we seek within the context of a particular dispute to clarify the existing provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. However, the relationship of the WTO Agreements to customary international law is broader than this. Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between the WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not "contract out" from it. To put it another way, to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the WTO.
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On these grounds, the panel applied "general rules of customary international law on good faith and error in treaty negotiations," 58 in particular Article 48 of the Vienna Convention. 59 The panel correctly rejected the argument a contrario that the reference in DSU Article 3.2 only to rules of treaty interpretation of customary international law means that all other international law is excluded. 60 The panel limited its reference to customary international law, but it should have referred to the broader class of general international law, including both general customary international law and general principles of law.
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Interplay with pre-1994 treaties. As seen, the WTO treaty was created against the background of general international law, a law that by its very nature applies to all WTO members without exception. But it also emerged in the context of other preexisting treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, binding on all or only some WTO members. The drafters of the WTO treaty must have been aware of this background. At least for international law purposes, it is not as if the United States were a different person depending on whether it acts in WIPO, UNEP, or the WTO, or on whether it is represented by the Office of the Trade Representative or the Department of State. Just as there are no sealed compartments between general international law and WTO law, no such compartments separate the WTO treaty from other treaties. Obviously, whereas general international law is binding on all WTO members, any of these non-WTO treaties with which the WTO treaty freely interacts only have effect as between those WTO members that accepted these treaties (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). Some of these pre-1994 non-WTO treaty rules have been terminated 62 or replaced 63 by the WTO treaty. Most of the others continue to exist. In the event of conflict, those that continue to exist must either give way to WTO rules or, conversely, prevail over them, depending on the applicable conflict rules. The latter rules may be found in three different places: the non-WTO treaty, the WTO treaty itself, and general international law.
First of all, conflict rules in the non-WTO treaty that allegedly contradicts the WTO treaty include those in Article 103 of the UN Charter, Article 311 of the LOS Convention, Article 22(1) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 64 Article 40 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 65 Article 4 of the European Energy Charter Treaty, 66 and the preamble to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 67 Second, although rules on how to solve conflicts between WTO and other norms of international law might be found in the WTO treaty itself, surprisingly enough 68 it says little about its relationship to other rules of international law. Thus, it does not include a general conflict clause setting out its relationship with preexisting international law. Nor does it explicitly state that it is to prevail over preexisting law or that it is without derogation from preexisting law. 69 It contains relatively limited exceptions with respect to GATT 1947 and related instruments, 70 UN Charter obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security, 71 the WIPO conventions incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, 72 certain dispute settlement provisions, 73 and regional trade arrangements. 74 78 The committee, however, did endorse "multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary or global nature" and said it preferred that trade disputes arising in connection with a multilateral environmental agreement be resolved through the mechanisms established by that agreement. WTO Doc. WT/CTE/1, para. 171 (1996) Committee on Trade and Environment, one of whose major tasks is to examine the relationship between the WTO treaty and multilateral environmental agreements. So far, this mandate has not resulted in any clear rules on conflicts. 78 Third, and most important for WTO purposes (given the absence of explicit conflict rules in the WTO treaty itself), further rules on how to solve normative conflicts must be sought in general international law, for example, as reflected in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. As regards most conflicts, the WTO treaty does not contract out of these rules; hence, they must also apply to WTO rules and how they interact with other rules of international law. The lack of an inherent hierarchy of rules of international law (other than jus cogens) makes the intention of the parties bound by both rules paramount in deciding which one ought to prevail (i.e., have the parties in some way expressed a preference for either rule?). 79 If such an expression of intention cannot be conclusively determined, resort must first be had to the lex posterior rule in Article 30 for conflicts between treaty norms. For other conflicts (such as those between a treaty and custom), this rule equally applies, once again on the ground that all rules of international law (other than jus cogens) have the same binding force, so that any later rule (i.e., any later expression of state consent) overrules an earlier contradictory rule.
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With respect to successive treaties between exactly the same states (Article 30(3)), the lex posterior rule follows logically since states are their own lawmakers, possessing the contractual freedom to "change their minds" (a later expression of consent prevails over an earlier one). The same applies to conflicts between a treaty and a subsequent inter se agreement as between states that agreed to both the original treaty and the inter se agreement (under Article 30(4)(a) the inter se agreement, as the later rule prevails). As between a state bound by both the original treaty and the inter se agreement, and another state bound only by the original treaty, the solution in Article 30(4)(b) (only the original treaty, not the inter se agreement, applies) results directly from the pacta tertiis principle. In this sense, Article 30 does not add normative solutions but simply confirms the logical consequences of other general principles of international law.
Indeed, when it comes to the "hard cases," Article 30 in and of itself hardly offers any solutions. 81 The "hard cases" are conflicts between treaty norms for which it is difficult or unreasonable to utilize one point in time as the moment at which they were matched with state consent. This is what happens with many multilateral treaty norms that form part of a regulatory framework or legal system created at one point in time but that continues to exist and evolve over a mostly indefinite period. Most rules of modern multilateral conventions fit this pattern (including rules of the WTO, many environmental conventions, human rights treaties, and the LOS Convention). They are part of a framework or system that is continuously confirmed, implemented, adapted, and expanded, for example, by means of judicial decisions, interpretations, new norms, and the accession of new state (1981) . He states that l'accord de volontés qui a présidé à la conclusion de la convention ne s'est pas épuisé dans la rédaction d'un texte; l'application d'une telle convention suppose nécessairement le renouvellement permanent de l'adhésion des Etats membres au contenu de normes juridiques dont l'instrument signé ne constitue qu'une expression solennelle, mais, par essence, éphémère. 83 For the proposition that it is the time of conclusion that counts, not the time of entry into force, see E. W. see Housman & Goldberg, supra note 78, at 303; TRADE MEASURES, supra note 78, ch. III. In extreme cases a conflict of norms may even be unresolvable and constitute a lacuna as a result of which a judge must pronounce a non liquet. 86 Elements of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 7, may also turn out to be decisive, see text at note 93 infra.
parties (for which both the consent of the new party and the reciprocal acceptance of all, or a majority of, the existing parties are required). Not only were such treaty norms consented to when they originally emerged, but they continue to be confirmed, either directly or indirectly, throughout their existence, in particular when monitored and evolving within the context of an international organization (e.g., the WTO). 82 It would be absurd and inconsistent with the genuine will of states to "freeze" such rules into the mold of the time when they were originally created and to label them an expression of state consent limited to, say, April 15, 1994. 83 This type of treaty norm belongs to what I term "continuing treaties" and does not reflect a once-and-for-all expression of state consent. 84 As a result, when such a treaty norm conflicts with another treaty norm, in particular another continuing treaty norm, the "guillotine" approach of time of conclusion (the later in time prevailing) may not make sense and could lead to arbitrary solutions. Would it not be absurd to conclude that for state A, which signed the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol in 1999 and subsequently acceded to the WTO, WTO rules prevail; whereas for state B, as an original (1994) WTO member, the Protocol prevails? Or, conversely, to say that for state C, a WTO member that acceded to the Convention on Climate Change only in 1997, the Convention prevails over WTO rules; whereas for state D, a WTO member that agreed to the Climate Change Convention when it was concluded in 1992, WTO rules prevail? More absurd still, did WTO rules, as between member states of the European Community (EC), prevail over the 1991 Maastricht Treaty simply because they were concluded later in time? And was this situation reversed in 1997 with the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty, once again simply because that treaty succeeded WTO rules ratione temporis?
In my view, this type of conflict can be resolved only by resorting to the intention of the parties to both treaties, even if it should be merely implicit 85 or has to be deduced from general principles of law or logic. Quite often this intention may be reflected in the structure or scope of the rules in question, be it ratione materiae or ratione personae. 86 Indeed, could one not say, reverting to the examples cited earlier, that a WTO rule prohibiting a certain type of trade restriction without product limitation (say, generally all import restrictions) must give way to an explicit right or even obligation in an environmental convention to restrict trade in a specified type of product? Equally, could it not be said that because of the
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87 That is, of course, to the extent EC rules are not prohibited by WTO rules, in which case WTO rules should prevail over EC rules. The situation envisaged here is rather one where an EC member state would invoke a right under WTO rules to restrict trade that contradicts an obligation under EC rules to promote free trade (EC rules being generally more advanced in terms of trade liberalization).
88 After all, in the Vienna Convention, supra note 7, no direct reference is made to lex specialis (except for rules of international organizations, Article 5). To read the requirement of "same subject-matter" in Article 30 as incorporating the lex specialis rule is not convincing. If a conflict between two rules does arise, see text at note 104 infra, they must necessarily relate to the same subject matter (even if one is more special than the other). See OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 1212 n.2; Vierdag, supra note 83, at 100. 89 It is difficult to speak of lex specialis as a genuine and decisive legal rule on how to solve conflict. Here, it is rather a rule of logic that may provide information on the "current expression of consent" of the parties. 90 See category 5 rules in text at note 40 supra and supra note 37. 91 See, for example, the preamble to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra note 67. 92 WTO Agreement Art. X.
further-reaching nature and special character of EC treaties ratione personae (i.e., as treaties between a limited number of like-minded states), WTO rules should give way, as between EC member states, to these treaties? 87 Although for reasons of legal certainty, a presumption could be established in favor of the theoretically "later-in-time rule" (if such a determination in time is even possible), 88 this presumption should be rebuttable concerning continuing treaty norms, not only by referring to an explicit conflict clause in either treaty, but also by referring to more implicit intentions of the parties to be deduced, for example, from the logic of one treaty's being more special than another. 89 Making the lex posterior rule rebuttable with respect to continuing treaty norms would not contravene the language of Article 30. Indeed, in these cases, no "successive treaties" exist, only "simultaneous treaties," so that arguably Article 30 does not apply at all.
WTO rules and post-1994 rules of international law. As pointed out above, 90 the universe of international law relevant to the WTO was not exhausted in April 1994. The WTO was not created in a vacuum (it emerged in the context of general international law and other treaties), nor does its legal existence continue in a vacuum. As much as the WTO treaty altered the landscape of international law in April 1994, so post-1994 rules can change the universe of law relevant to the WTO. WTO members can conclude, and have indeed concluded, new treaties that may have an impact on the WTO treaty. These new, post-1994 treaties may simply add to or confirm preexisting rules, but they may also terminate, contradict, or suspend WTO rules. Insofar as they conflict with existing WTO rules, the new treaty rules may prevail over the contradictory WTO rules or may, in contrast, have to give way to such WTO rules. Everything will depend, again, on the conflict rules set out in the WTO treaty, those in the new post-1994 treaty, 91 or those of general international law outlined earlier. Of course, only WTO members that agreed to the new treaty can be bound by it. The rights and obligations of WTO members that are not parties to the new treaty cannot be affected (pacta tertiis).
Special attention must be given to what is referred to in international law as inter se modifications of the WTO treaty. Treaty modification refers to the situation where only some of the parties to a multilateral agreement conclude an inter se agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves. In contrast to amendment, 92 for example, the WTO treaty does not provide for an equally extensive lex specialis contracting out of general international law rules on modification. As a result, in most cases one must "fall back" on these rules of general international law. In this regard, Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention provides as follows:
Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: 93 We assume that this article represents customary international law binding on all WTO members. The thrust of Article 41 is explicitly confirmed, for example, in Article 311(3) of the LOS Convention, supra note 23. See also Article 58 of the Vienna Convention on inter se suspension. 94 Articles III and XI outlaw, respectively, discrimination regarding imports as opposed to domestic products and the imposition of quantitative border measures. 95 Article XX allows for trade restrictions, for example, that are "necessary" to protect human health. Another example is an inter se agreement between some WTO members only to impose an import ban on hormone-treated beef as between themselves alone, notwithstanding the WTO reports on European CommunitiesMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Docs. WT/DS26/R, WT/DS26/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998) (declaring such a ban inconsistent with the SPS Agreement) [hereinafter EC-Hormones].
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations;
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 93 For WTO purposes, a distinction should be made between two types of inter se modifications: (1) those further liberalizing trade as between some WTO members only, for which the WTO treaty has explicit rules; and (2) those restricting trade in contrast to trade flows called for under the WTO treaty (again, as between some WTO members only), on which the WTO treaty is silent. An example of the former is a free trade arrangement. An example of the latter is an agreement between two WTO members not to invoke GATT Articles III and XI 94 vis-à-vis certain trade restrictions they both consider to be justified (even though, in principle, they are contrary to GATT rules, including, for example, Article XX). 95 This second category of inter se modifications could also include inter se agreements regarding a particular WTO dispute in which two WTO members decide not to invoke certain procedural rights granted to them in the DSU, or an inter se agreement between some members broadening the scope for "compulsory licensing" of essential drugs (in deviation of TRIPS Article 31).
The first type of inter se modification (further liberalization as between some WTO members only) is explicitly dealt with in the WTO treaty itself (another example of its contracting out of general international law). The WTO treaty prohibits such modifications unless they (1) extend the increased liberalization to all WTO members (in accordance with WTO rules on most-favored-nation treatment); or (2) conform with the conditions in GATT Article XXIV (GATS Article V) on regional arrangements. Being "prohibited by the treaty" in the sense of Article 41(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, they cannot validly modify WTO rules as between the WTO members that concluded the inter se agreement, and a fortiori, they cannot affect the WTO rights and obligations of members that are not party to the inter se agreement.
In contrast, the WTO treaty does not provide for lex specialis regarding the second type of inter se modifications (mainly agreements to restrict trade as between some WTO members only). Indeed, nothing in the treaty prevents a limited number of WTO members from signing an agreement, for example, not to invoke GATT Articles III or XI in respect of certain trade restrictions they both believe to be justified (but which they know or fear do not meet, say, GATT Article XX). Since this kind of inter se modification is "not prohibited by the 96 If the rights of a third party are nevertheless affected, this party can bring a claim before a WTO panel, which should enforce its WTO rights over and above the inter se agreement to which the WTO member in question is not a party. See infra part II. 97 Even if these rights and obligations derive from a multilateral treaty. The system of WTO countermeasures provides proof of how "bilateral" in nature the WTO still is, as countermeasures take the form only of state-to-state "suspensions of concessions or other obligations," not collective sanctions. Pauwelyn, supra note 26, at 342. 98 The ILC commentary to Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 7, notes that "[h]istory furnishes a number of instances of inter se agreements which substantially changed the régime of the treaty and which overrode the objections of interested States." The one example provided is that of "an inter se agreement modifying substantive provisions of a disarmament or neutralization treaty." DIETRICH RAUSCHNING, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON With respect to the first condition, although an inter se derogation from WTO rules (say, an agreement to restrict trade as between two members where WTO rules prohibit such a restriction) will probably affect trade flows with certain third parties (most probably in a positive way), the WTO rights and obligations of these third parties must, and normally will, remain unaffected by the inter se agreement. If not, the agreement will contravene not only the first condition in Article 41(1)(b), but also the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. 96 As for the second condition, it is difficult to predict exactly which WTO rights are so important that "giving them away" inter se (without affecting the rights of third parties) would threaten the effective execution of the object and purpose of the WTO treaty as a whole (if any such rights even exist). Indeed, since most WTO rights and obligations can be reduced in theory to reciprocal rights and obligations as between two WTO members, 97 it is difficult to see how inter se modifications that are not prohibited by the WTO treaty itself could nevertheless prejudice "the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole." 98 This reference to "the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole" is reminiscent of the distinction introduced by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice between treaties imposing obligations of (1) a reciprocal nature; (2) an interdependent nature; and (3) an integral nature. 99 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is named as an example of a "reciprocal" treaty, in which the obligations, like most WTO treaty provisions, can be reduced to a bilateral state-to-state relationship. The example given of an "interdependent" treaty is a disarmament treaty. There, obligations are not purely bilateral, and the performance of one party's obligations depends on performance by all the other parties. Whenever one party violates its obligations, it necessarily does so toward all the others and further performance would be of little use. Finally, the 1948 Genocide Convention serves as an example of an "integral" treaty. The binding nature of the obligations in question is autonomous and absolute. The treaty cannot be reduced to state-to-state obligations, nor does it depend on the performance of other parties. Inter se agreements modifying "interdependent" and, in particular, "integral" treaties are most likely to affect the rights of third parties, as well as be incompatible with "the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole." 100 Inter se agreements modifying "reciprocal" agreements, in contrast, are less prone to have this effect. In this light, many obligations in environmental treaties arguably have an "interdependent" (some even an "integral") nature, whereas most obligations in human rights treaties might be seen as falling into the class of "integral" obligations. Hence, inter se modifications of these ("interdependent" or "integral") environmental and human rights treaties (including modifications by the WTO treaty itself) might have difficulty passing the test of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention-much more, indeed, than modifications of the "reciprocal" WTO treaty, for example, by an inter se environmental or human rights agreement. Since Article 30 (5) makes reference to Article 41, one must keep these considerations prominently in mind when applying the lex posterior rule as well. If (but only if) inter se modifications of the WTO treaty meet the conditions set out above, they will validly change the legal relationship between the WTO members that are party to the modification. 101 Once again, however, the inter se modification cannot alter the rights and obligations of third parties.
The landscape of treaty rules is not the only one that may be changed since 1994. General international law, in particular customary law, may also be modified. In that event, the conflict rule set out above applies, that is, in case of conflict the later custom must prevail over the earlier treaty norm unless the intention to continue applying the treaty as lex specialis can be shown. 102 Since most WTO rules are continuing treaty norms, this intention will normally be readily found. As Kontou observed: "A prior treaty that was intended to be an exception from the general regulation of the subject-matter will … remain in force as originally drafted, notwithstanding any subsequent developments in custom."
103 For example, if customary law rules on countermeasures were to change, the DSU provisions on "suspension of concessions," which contract out of some of these customary rules and continue to do so given the "continuing" nature of the DSU, would not, in my view, be required to give way to these changes. In contrast, if certain principles on the settlement of disputes not contracted out from by the WTO treaty (say, rules on burden of proof) were to change, these changes would necessarily also apply to the WTO.
Defining Conflicts in International Law
Much has been said so far on how to solve conflicts between rules of international law. A logically prior step, however, is to define when two rules actually contradict each other. I pointed out earlier (concerning the creation of treaties in the context of general international law) that international law recognizes a presumption against conflict. 104 The presumption derives from the fact that all international law is created in the context of preexisting law, which continues to exist unless new law overturns it. The presumption is grounded on the absence of any inherent legal hierarchy between existing and new rules of international law (other than jus cogens). In the context of assessing whether two specific treaty norms are indeed in conflict, it means that states negotiating a new treaty will have the old treaty in mind and continue to abide by it unless explicit wording to the contrary shows the drafters' intention to deviate from it. Thus, it is assumed that the later rule builds on and follows what the earlier rule has said. 105 In most cases, potential conflicts can be "interpreted away."
106 As already mentioned, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention directs that, in interpreting WTO rules, account should be taken of "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." First of all, several broadly worded exceptions in the WTO treaty allow for trade restrictions resulting from, for example, environmental standards (such as GATT Article XX). These WTO exceptions must be read, to the extent possible, to harmonize with other rules of international law. actually changing the treaty), such an interpretation must be preferred. Only when a harmonious reading is not feasible does a legal conflict arise. Because treaty interpretation permits this often ample room for maneuvering (of both the WTO and the non-WTO rules), genuine legal conflicts should be rather scarce.
The exact definition of conflict in international law is unclear. Wilfred Jenks, for example, argues that "[a] conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties."
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The WTO Appellate Body in Guatemala-Cement seems to follow this strict definition, defining conflict as "a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision."
108 This means, in effect, that in all other cases (not involving mutually exclusive obligations) the rule of international law that imposes the (strictest) obligation always prevails (not because of rules on how to solve conflict, but as a result of the very definition of conflict).
In my view, this definition of conflict is too strict. Imagine, for example, that a WTO rule imposes an obligation not to restrict certain trade flows, but a later non-WTO rule (say, an environmental convention) grants an explicit right to restrict trade. Under the strict definition of legal conflict, set out above, there would be no conflict. Indeed, complying with the WTO rule (not restricting trade flows) would not mean violating the later environmental rule. It would simply mean forgoing the right (to restrict trade) granted by the environmental rule. In the absence of a conflict, the lex posterior rule of Article 30 would not even be activated. Thus, the (stricter) WTO rule would simply apply over and above the new (more lenient) environmental rule, not as a result of conflict rules but as a result of the very definition of conflict. However, for the new environmental rule to have any effect, it should be recognized that in these circumstances as well there is conflict, namely, conflict between an obligation in the WTO and an explicit right granted elsewhere. 109 Here, too, the later-intime rule should prevail, in principle. If not, one would consistently elevate obligations in international law over and above rights in international law. The approach adopted so far in the WTO on the definition of conflict (recognizing conflict only when one legal obligation prevents the fulfillment of another legal obligation) calls to mind analogies with the interplay of human rights treaties. Generally, a succession of human rights treaties can result only in giving individuals, the beneficiaries of human rights, an accumulation (not a loss) of human rights. Article 60 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides, for example: "Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party."
110 But this principle of "accumulation only" in the field of human rights derives from a repeated and explicit conflict clause in human rights treaties (one that could arguably be considered part of special customary law in the field of human rights). WTO treaties, however (with the limited exception of TRIPS Article 2(2) 111 ), contain no provision stating that whenever a state, or for that matter a trader, has been granted a right to free trade, that right can only be complemented by additional free trade rights but not detracted from by an opposing right of other states to restrict trade. 113 See text at notes 5-12 supra. 114 There is, of course, the ICJ, the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations." UN CHARTER Art. 92. But the Court has compulsory jurisdiction only as between some states and as regards certain subject matters (such as those defined under the optional clause system of Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute). 115 For exceptions, see the section on implied jurisdiction infra p. 555. 116 UN CHARTER Art. 2(3). 117 Id., Art. 33(1).
Consequently, it must be possible for an explicit right to restrict trade, 112 agreed upon by certain or all WTO members either in or outside the WTO, to overrule a WTO obligation of free trade. The WTO treaty was not negotiated for the benefit only of exporters or free traders, the way human rights treaties were negotiated for the benefit of individuals. The WTO treaty provides for an overall framework regulating the trade relations between states. It must consequently take account of interests in favor of both trade liberalization and nontrade values necessitating trade restrictions.
In summing up part I of this article, we note that the thesis presented here gives entirely new meaning to the, at first sight, innocent statement that WTO law is part of public international law. The WTO is not a secluded island but part of the territorial domain of international law. In addition, this "membership" does not involve closed doors or sealed-off compartments but, rather, cross-fertilization. WTO law enriches public international law. In April 1994, it enhanced preexisting rights and obligations, and new WTO rules continue to do so today. But the reverse is equally true: public international law (to the extent the WTO has not contracted out of it) is enriching and continues to enrich WTO law. The relationship may not always be harmonious. In the event of genuine legal conflict, an appropriate definition of conflict and rules on how to solve it set out in the WTO treaty, the non-WTO treaty, or general international law must provide the solution. Apart from the prohibition on deviating from jus cogens, this solution must be derived first and foremost from the common intention of the parties to both treaties (obviously, a WTO member not bound by the non-WTO rule cannot be held to it). The WTO treaty itself provides very little guidance in this respect, so that conflict rules of general international law (in particular, Articles 30 and 41 of the Vienna Convention, but also elements related to lex specialis) will often be decisive in showing the way.
II. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
International law lacks not only a central "legislator" and an inherent hierarchy of its rules (other than jus cogens), 113 but also a unified international "judiciary" to which all pertinent disputes could be referred. 114 The jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal cannot be presumed. It must be granted by the consent of states in explicit terms.
115 Peaceful settlement is the only available means to settle disputes. 116 However, general international law does not oblige states actually to settle disputes or, a fortiori, to submit all disputes to one given court. States are free to choose the court or tribunal they want. 117 The jurisdiction of an international adjudicator depends on the parties'consent. States may decide to authorize an ad hoc arbitrator to settle their dispute. In that case they will often specify, by consent, both the subject matter in dispute and the applicable law. States may also decide to create a standing judicial body (such as the ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS] , and the WTO Appellate Body) and grant their consent ex ante for this body to hear not so much a given dispute but a certain type of dispute (for example, disputes on certain subjects or claims under a given convention). When doing so, states are required to specify, in advance, certain general procedural rules to be followed by the parties and the court question. These general procedural rules or statutes may include a provision on the "applicable law." 118 Whereas the consent to jurisdiction and the definition of the applicable law in ad hoc arbitration are mostly clear and precise, the reference ex ante to a standing judicial body often results in jurisdictional objections by the defending state and makes discussions on applicable law more frequent. Consequently, despite the lack of a general hierarchy of rules of international law, the need for explicit consent for legal claims to be brought before an international court or tribunal means that, in a sense, a "two-class society" does exist, namely, between rules of international law that can be judicially enforced before a court with compulsory jurisdiction and those that cannot.
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The Nature of WTO Dispute Settlement
At first glance, one may doubt whether the DSU actually provides for the judicial settlement of disputes. First, contrary to the Appellate Body, WTO panels are not standing bodies but ad hoc tribunals created pursuant to predetermined procedures in the DSU. Panels must be established ad hoc for each case by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 120 (they cannot be established by the mere will of the disputing parties). Still, their establishment is quasi-automatic pursuant to the negative consensus rule in DSU Article 6(1). In terms of their mode of establishment, panels could thus be qualified as encompassing a mixture between arbitration and judicial dispute settlement. Yet when it comes to their actual function and way of handling disputes, the DSU leaves no doubt that panels are judicial in nature. Second, the legal findings and conclusions of both panels and the Appellate Body culminate only in "recommendations" to the defending party. These recommendations must still be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body to obtain their legally binding force as between the parties to the dispute. Once again, this body takes its decision by negative consensus, i.e., quasi-automatically (under DSU Articles 16.4 and 17.14). At most, this procedure could mean that the WTO judiciary includes the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. In practice, however, both panels and the Appellate Body are established, operate, and reach their legal conclusions in an entirely independent and law-based fashion. They are judicial tribunals in the international law sense.
WTO members granted compulsory jurisdiction to this WTO "judiciary" ex ante and on a claim-specific basis (claims under WTO covered agreements only). It was not granted general jurisdiction to adjudicate all trade disputes between WTO members (i.e., on a subject matter basis). Importantly, it is generally accepted that no counterclaims (not even counterclaims under WTO covered agreements) can be made. If a defendant wishes, in turn, to lodge a complaint about the acts of the plaintiff, it must start a new procedure. 121 The importance of the WTO judiciary's holding compulsory jurisdiction for all WTO claims cannot be overestimated. 122 As noted above, WTO rules have an "all-affecting" character, which means that even disputes with a relatively limited trade aspect can be brought before the WTO (such as the trade aspects of human rights disputes and disputes over high seas fishing or territorial borders 123 trade restrictions are imposed. But a state wanting to enforce compliance, for example, with most environmental rules has no recourse to international jurisdiction. In the alternative, trade sanctions can be imposed, but there again the victim of the sanctions (i.e., the alleged violator of the environmental rule) may complain to the WTO. The state imposing the sanctions cannot in most instances resort, say, to UNEP for judicial settlement. 124 All of these factors increase the potential and importance of interplay between the WTO and other rules of international law in WTO dispute settlement.
The Jurisdiction of WTO Panels
Substantive jurisdiction. As seen, the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited to claims under WTO covered agreements. Under its Article 1.1, the DSU applies to "disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the [DSU] ." These provisions allow for so-called violation complaints (claims of violation of WTO rules), nonviolation complaints, and situation complaints 125 (hereinafter referred to jointly as claims under WTO covered agreements or WTO claims). DSU Article 3.2 confirms that the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited to claims under WTO covered agreements, stating that the DSU mechanism "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements." The standard terms of reference of WTO panels are
[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB . . . and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s). (DSU Art. 7.1) Finally, DSU Article 11 instructs panels to "make an objective assessment of . . . the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements." Consequently, no claims of violation of rules of international law other than those set out in WTO covered agreements can be brought before a WTO panel. Similarly, a WTO panel does not have jurisdiction to consider claims under WTO rules other than those included in WTO covered agreements (such as the ministerial decisions and declarations that are part of the Final Act, but not of the WTO Agreement; or rules set out in a mutually acceptable solution agreed upon in the context of a WTO dispute). Nor does it have jurisdiction to rule on claims of violation of non-WTO rules, such as environmental or human rights conventions or rules of general international law (including rules of customary law and/or jus cogens). A WTO panel may only decide these other claims if the parties to the dispute in question grant it this jurisdiction ad hoc and by mutual consent, for example, by explicitly agreeing on special terms of reference pursuant to DSU Article 7.3 or by referring the dispute, including these other claims, to arbitration under DSU Article 25.
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Although a WTO panel has jurisdiction only over WTO claims, it should be recalled that some WTO rules (of category 3 outlined above 127 ) explicitly confirm and incorporate preexisting non-WTO treaty rules. These non-WTO rules have thereby become WTO rules that can be judicially enforced by a panel. 128 Other WTO rules do not incorporate non-WTO rules but do refer to them explicitly. In this way these non-WTO rules can become part 131 The non-WTO rules in the other WTO Agreements serve only as a benchmark or basis for the assessment of a distinct WTO-specific obligation. Thus, the international standards referred to in the SPS Agreement (say, codex standards) cannot serve as the basis for an independent claim of breach before a WTO panel, but when WTO members base their sanitary measures on such standards, they will be presumed to conform with the SPS Agreement as well.
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Implied or incidental jurisdiction. Even though the substantive jurisdiction of any international court or tribunal must be granted explicitly by the parties involved, once such a forum has been seized of a specific matter, it has certain implied jurisdictional powers that derive directly from its very nature as a judicial body. This so-called incidental or implied jurisdiction is also inherent in the mandate of WTO panels (as international bodies of a judicial nature). Elements of this incidental jurisdiction are the jurisdiction (1) "to interpret the submissions of the parties" in order to "isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim"; 133 (2) to determine whether one has substantive jurisdiction to decide a matter (the principle of la compétence de la compétence); and (3) to decide whether one should refrain from exercising validly established substantive jurisdiction. 134 To this one could add the jurisdiction to decide all matters linked to the exercise of substantive jurisdiction and inherent in the judicial function 135 (such as claims under rules on burden of proof, due process, and other general international law rules on the judicial settlement of disputes or state responsibility, including the power to order cessation, assurances of nonrepetition, and reparation for breach). 136 The jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures, explicitly conferred on some courts and tribunals, 137 is not generally recognized as part of their implied jurisdiction. A panel has to address those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings "in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members." The Apellate Body confirmed that WTO panels have la compétence de la compétence in United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, where it referred to the "widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before it." 139 The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadi! case (in deciding, contrary to the ruling of the trial chamber, that it did have jurisdiction to review the validity of its establishment by the Security Council) noted that this implied jurisdiction "is a necessary component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not need to be expressly provided for in the constitutive document of . . . tribunals." Indeed, observed the chamber," [t] o assume that the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal is absolutely limited to what the Security Council 'intended' to entrust it with, is to envisage the International Tribunal exclusively as a 'subsidiary organ' of the Security Council." 140 In addition, the implied jurisdiction to decide whether one should refrain from exercising substantive jurisdiction finds reflection in WTO jurisprudence in the prominent role of the so-called principle of judicial economy. This principle was referred to in United States-Shirts and Blouses as providing that "[a] panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue."
141 It should be stressed that the question of jurisdiction is to be examined by the court or tribunal proprio motu. 142 In United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, the Appellate Body correctly rejected the EC argument that the United States had raised a jurisdictional objection before the panel in an untimely manner since an international tribunal "is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative." 143 
WTO claims in a wider dispute mainly about non-WTO matters.
The issue may arise as to whether a WTO panel has jurisdiction to hear WTO claims even though the underlying or predominant element of disagreement derives from other rules of international law that cannot be judicially enforced in the WTO (such as rules on the law of the sea, territorial delimitation, and human rights). This jurisdictional issue must be distinguished from the issue of the role of non-WTO rules before a WTO panel once that panel has decided to hear a case (discussed further below 144 ). First of all, recall that a WTO panel has the implied jurisdiction to decide whether, and to what extent, it has substantive jurisdiction over a given dispute. What is more, it must exercise this jurisdiction on its own initiative. Second, no burden of proof is involved in establishing jurisdiction. As indicated by the ICJ in Border and Transborder Armed Actions, "The existence of jurisdiction of the Court in a given case is . . . not a question of fact, but a question of law . . . ."
145 With respect to questions of law, the principle jura novit curia applies: the judge knows the law; it is not for either party to establish it. Still, an important question remains: whether in case of doubt the (noting, for example, that "Nicaragua's claims are so integrally and essentially bound up with the treaty provisions on which they rely that, if those provisions cannot be pleaded, there is no case which the Court can consider," and calling the "salami-slicing" approach in this instance "an unreal, artificial, highly constricted-and yet unduly unconstrained-process"); Oda, 1986 ICJ REP. at 219; and Jennings, id. at 530. Oda had a strong point in saying that "the Court should have proved, not that it can apply customary and general international law independently, but that the dispute referred to it in the Applicant's claims had not arisen under these multilateral treaties." In that case, the Court actually did somewhat confuse the issue of applicable law (custom versus treaty) with that of jurisdiction (over certain disputes).
decide that it has jurisdiction or decline jurisdiction instead. On this issue, the ICJ noted that it will "only affirm its jurisdiction provided that the force of the arguments militating in favour of it is preponderant. The fact that weighty arguments can be advanced to support the contention that it has no jurisdiction cannot of itself create a doubt calculated to upset its jurisdiction."
146 Under WTO jurisprudence, the level or degree of proof required may be slightly lower, amounting to a presumption (in favor of jurisdiction) not sufficiently rebutted by the defendant.
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With these considerations in mind, one can imagine two possible solutions to the problem of panel jurisdiction over predominantly non-WTO disputes. First, it could be submitted that as soon as a WTO member brings a claim pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of WTO covered agreements (i.e., a WTO claim), a WTO panel has jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim notwithstanding the fact that the wider dispute underlying the claim also or even predominantly involves other rules of international law. In most (if not all) cases, this will be the preferred solution. The WTO does not provide for compulsory dispute settlement only in the event a WTO member wants to bring a WTO claim to the WTO. DSU Article 23.1 prescribes that " [w] hen Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objectives of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the [DSU] ." A WTO panel has interpreted this provision as being an "exclusive dispute resolution clause."
148 DSU Article 11 also supports the competence of panels to examine WTO claims, even if non-WTO rules are of crucial or higher importance in the context of the wider dispute. This provision directs panels to "make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements." 149 The standard terms of reference of WTO panels provide to similar effect (DSU Art. 7.1).
Support for such "salami slicing" of disputes 150 can be found in the Nicaragua case, where the ICJ declared that it had jurisdiction over certain claims under customary international law brought by Nicaragua against the United States. The Court did so even though the United States had not accepted ICJ jurisdiction over "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless . . . all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court," and even though the multilateral treaty rules largely overlapped with the customary law invoked by Nicaragua. 151 154 See, e.g., U.S.-Copyright, supra note 131 (which requested information from WIPO). 155 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in Nicaragua, supra note 151. Recall also that a WTO panel cannot hear counterclaims, a restriction that may limit its ability actually to resolve a dispute, see Chile-Swordfish, supra note 35 (in the WTO only the European Community complained, but in ITLOS both parties submitted claims). 157 Supra note 133 and corresponding text. In the more recent Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the ICJ redefined Spain's complaint relating to Canada's lack of entitlement to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas into a dispute "arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures" regarding which Canada had made a reservation. On that basis, the Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Jurisdiction, 1998 ICJ REP. 429, 437 (Dec. 4). 158 The Appellate Body used this approach, not to decide on jurisdiction but on which WTO rules to apply, in EC-Asbestos, supra note 130, WTO Doc. WT/DS135, para. 62 (Mar. 12, 2001) . 159 Bluefin Tuna Award, supra note 122, paras. 52, 54. But see the forceful separate opinion by Sir Kenneth Keith.
cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important." 152 Thomas Schoenbaum mentions the possibility of requesting an ICJ advisory opinion if a WTO panel must decide a matter of non-WTO law, a procedure he considers "extremely cumbersome." 153 In assessing non-WTO rules, however, panels could be assisted by other international tribunals or organizations through the operation of DSU Article 13.1, which allows a panel to "seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate." 154 As a second way of dealing with predominantly non-WTO disputes, one could argue that in certain extreme cases the dispute no longer genuinely concerns WTO claims (even though such claims could technically be made) but, rather, other rules of international law that the WTO claims are inextricably linked to and that these WTO claims are dependent on to be decided. 155 In such extreme cases it could then be submitted that the history, prior procedures, and substantive content of the dispute indicate that the real issue of the case (i.e., the genuine object of the claim) is related to non-WTO claims as to which a WTO panel does not have jurisdiction. On these grounds, the WTO panel could either decide that it does not have substantive jurisdiction over the dispute or find that it does have jurisdiction but does not consider it appropriate to exercise this jurisdiction. 156 In this respect, one should recall that WTO panels, like any international court or tribunal, have the implied jurisdiction "to interpret the submissions of the parties" so as to "isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim."
157 As was confirmed in WTO jurisprudence on the principle of judicial economy, WTO panels also have the implied jurisdiction to decide whether or not to exercise substantive jurisdiction even if, in theory, this jurisdiction was conferred upon them. Support for this second solution or "incorporation" (auxiliarum principali sequitur) approach 158 can be found in the recent Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitration award. There, the tribunal found that the dispute, "while centered in the 1993 [trilateral Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna], also arises under [the LOS Convention]." However, it added that "[t]o find that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the [1993 Convention] would be artificial." 159 Since the tribunal later declared that it did not have jurisdiction over the 1993 Convention part of the dispute, it automatically declined jurisdiction over the LOS Convention part (notwithstanding the compulsory jurisdiction in Part XV of the latter) on the ground of its "single dispute" theory.
Although for present purposes the sticking point is a related subject matter or claim over which WTO panels have no jurisdiction, it is instructive to recall that the ICJ has found that it cannot decide a case when doing so would necessarily imply making a ruling with respect to states regarding which it has no jurisdiction. 160 In any event, for a WTO panel to dismiss a case because it has no substantive jurisdiction, or because it does not consider it appropriate to exercise this jurisdiction, is not the same as proclaiming a non liquet. In a non liquet a panel would find that it has substantive jurisdiction and that its exercise would be appropriate, but nevertheless conclude that it cannot come to a substantive legal conclusion on the ground that there is no law to be applied or that the applicable law is unclear. WTO dispute settlement, as a claim-specific mechanism, generally precludes non liquet (which is often portrayed as prohibited under general international law 161 ). A WTO claim is either valid (and the complainant wins) or unfounded (and the complainant loses). A panel should not normally be allowed to conclude that the WTO rules invoked are unclear ( jura novit curia) and on that basis proclaim a non liquet.
The need for a WTO panel actually to decide whether non-WTO rules have been violated could arise particularly in a so-called nonviolation case. In assessing whether certain governmental measures, though not violative of WTO rules, have affected the legitimate expectations that could have been derived from a trade concession, a WTO panel could be called upon to refer to such non-WTO rules as international competition law or international labor or environmental law. A complainant could invoke these non-WTO rules along the following lines:
When we obtained your trade concession (duty-free access for our computers), we did so in the expectation that you would continue to respect international labor standards (in particular, not to employ children under the age of ten). Now you have violated these non-WTO rules (children under the age of ten assemble computers in your country). This violation of labor standards does not violate WTO rules as such, but it nullifies the trade value of your concession, a nullification that we could not have foreseen (you are now able to produce much cheaper computers than before and outsell our computers, which are produced with full respect for international labor standards). Therefore, in the WTO we should be compensated for this nullification under the heading of nonviolation.
The nonviolation claim in our example may thus require a WTO panel to decide whether employing children under the age of ten violates non-WTO international labor standards that are binding as between the disputing parties. The Appellate Body, however, has recently confirmed that the nonviolation remedy "should be approached with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy." 162 This trend goes against endorsing the broad interpretation paraphrased above.
The Applicable Law Before a WTO Panel
Once it has been determined that a WTO panel has jurisdiction to hear a case, the panel must ascertain the law to be applied so as to resolve the WTO claims concerned. The applicable law before a WTO panel is delimited by four factors: 163 DSU Arts. 6.2, 7.1. 164 Id., Art. 3.10. 165 See text following note 132 supra. 166 Of course, to the extent that this necessity to rule on non-WTO matters has not led the panel to find that it does not have substantive jurisdiction in the first place or that it does not consider it appropriate to exercise such jurisdiction. See text at note 144 supra. 167 See text at notes 104-12 supra. 168 Other conflict rules to solve intra-WTO conflicts can be found in the Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Art. 21, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 39; TBT Agreement Art. 1.5; and DSU Art. 1.2. Surprisingly, the WTO treaty does not include conflict rules to solve contradictions between provisions in GATT, GATS, and TRIPS. On the GATT . 169 See text following note 78 supra. 170 See text at note 67 supra.
panel request. 163 Counterclaims are not allowed within the same procedure. 164 A panel may also be required to make other findings pursuant to its implied jurisdiction 165 or to come to a legal conclusion within the purview of the WTO claims themselves.
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(2) The defenses invoked by the defending party. Except for matters or defenses that it must consider ex officio (such as its own jurisdiction), a WTO panel must limit its examination to defenses invoked by the defending party (non ultra petita).
(3) The scope of the relevant rules ratione materiae, ratione personae, and ratione temporis. Within the framework of the claims and defenses thus before it, a WTO panel can employ only those rules which apply to the facts and circumstances of the case before it.
(4) Conflict rules in the WTO treaty, general international law, and other non-WTO treaties. If two or more rules apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and are contradictory (pursuant to the definition of conflict described earlier 167 ), a WTO panel must apply the relevant conflict rules. When two rules in WTO covered agreements conflict, the WTO treaty states in a series of provisions which one should prevail. For example, conflicts between the WTO Agreement and any of the multilateral trade agreements (such as the GATT, GATS, TRIPS, and DSU) must be resolved in favor of the WTO Agreement (Art. XVI:3). In the event of conflict between the GATT 1994 and another agreement on trade in goods in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement, the other Annex 1A agreement prevails. 168 If no conflict rules can be found for intra-WTO conflicts in the WTO treaty itself or for conflicts between WTO rules and other rules of international law, the conflict rules of general international law must be resorted to, 169 as well as any conflict rules in the non-WTO treaty containing the contradictory rule of international law. 170 Crucially, and this is one of the main points of this article, the fact that the substantive jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited to claims under WTO covered agreements does not mean that the applicable law available to a WTO panel is necessarily limited to WTO covered agreements. Much has been said above about the creation and continuing existence of the WTO treaty in the wider context of general international law and other non-WTO treaties, be they pre-or post-1994. This context and background (essentially, that WTO rules belong to the rules of international law) does not suddenly evaporate when WTO claims are transferred to a WTO panel. As submitted earlier, there is arguably a "two-class society" between those rules of international law that can be judicially enforced and those that cannot. In that sense, rules of international law may indeed operate at two levels: the first and most general level being that of the entire corpus of public international law where all rules of international law freely interact; and the second and more specific level being that of a court of international law with jurisdiction to enforce only a limited number of rules. Rules in WTO covered agreements operate at both the first and the second levels. However, these two levels do not exist in "splendid isolation." An obvious link joins them. In particular, if at the first, more general level of the entire corpus of international law, WTO rules are somehow changed, that change will necessarily be felt in and penetrate the second, more concrete level of WTO dispute settlement. (The exact consequences of such change will be discussed below.
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) Like the WTO treaty itself, the WTO dispute settlement system set up by that treaty was not created and does not exist in a legal vacuum. That system is merely an instrument to enforce WTO covered agreements as they were created and necessarily continue to exist in the wider corpus of international law. It is not frozen into April 1994 law or limited to the four corners of WTO covered agreements (even if it is limited to enforcing claims under these agreements). No treaty can be created outside the system of international law, nor can a court or tribunal that enforces claims under a treaty. The Lockerbie cases perfectly illustrate this point. There, the ICJ had jurisdiction to consider Libyan claims only under the Montreal Convention. However, this did not stop it from also examining other international law, in particular UN Security Council Resolution 748 invoked in defense by the United Kingdom and the United States, as part of the applicable law. 172 Relevant DSU provisions and WTO jurisprudence. The DSU limits the jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body. It does not limit the potentially applicable law before them. Unlike the LOS Convention and the Statute of the ICJ, 173 the DSU does not include an explicit provision on "applicable law." The repeated references to "providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system," preserving "the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements" (DSU Art. 3.2), protecting the "benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements," and maintaining the "proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members" (DSU Art. 3.3), as well as the panel function of assessing the "applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements" (DSU Art. 11), relate to the jurisdiction or substantive mandate of WTO panels to judicially enforce only WTO covered agreements, not to the law that may be applied in doing so. DSU Article 7 is more directed to applicable law. 174 Paragraph 1 sets out the standard terms of reference of panels and instructs them to examine the matter referred to them "in the light of the relevant provisions" of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute. Paragraph 2 obliges panels to "address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute." However, and again crucially for the thesis in this paper, despite this obligation to address and possibly apply these WTO rules, nothing in the DSU or any other WTO rule precludes panels from addressing and, as the case may be, applying other rules of international law so as to decide the WTO claims before them. 175 As outlined earlier with respect to the WTO treaty, the DSU, a judicial system aimed at enforcing certain rules of international law, need not refer explicitly to or confirm all other potentially relevant rules of international law, be they pre-or post-1994. Such reference or confirmation occurs automatically as a result of the simple fact that the DSU was created and continues to exist in the wider context of international law. Thus, other rules of international law apply automatically unless the DSU or any other WTO rule has contracted out of them. As the panel in Korea-Government Procurement noted (in a footnote!) about the rules of customary international law that it referred to in examining the nonviolation complaint before it: "We do not see any basis for arguing that the terms of reference [in DSU Article 7.1] are meant to exclude reference to the broader rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the Panel." 176 Unlike Article 291 of the LOS Convention and Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the DSU does not explicitly confirm its creation and existence in international law. However, there was no need for the DSU to do so, as it cannot have been otherwise. 177 Implicit confirmation that WTO panels, when examining WTO claims, may be required to refer to and apply other rules of international law can be found in DSU Articles 3.2, 178 7.1, and 11. The obligation in Article 11 to assess the applicability of WTO rules objectively may require a paneldepending on the claims, defenses, and facts of the matter before it-to refer to and apply other rules of international law. These other rules may show that the relevant WTO rules do not apply and have therefore not been violated. However, failure to look at these other rules would preclude an "objective assessment of . . . the applicability of . . . the relevant covered agreements." The reference in Article 11 to making all "other findings" (or, in the words of DSU Article 7.1, all "such findings") as will assist the DSB in resolving the WTO claims before it further acknowledges that WTO panels may need to resort to and apply rules of international law beyond WTO covered agreements. Hence, to deduce from the explicit references in paragraphs 1 and 2 of DSU Article 7 (quoted above) to some law (i.e., WTO covered agreements) that all other law is thereby implicitly excluded is erroneous. Indeed, in practice the terms of reference of WTO panels do not read as requiring an examination "in the light of the relevant provisions in . . . the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute" but, rather, an examination in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the complainant in its panel request. Does this exclusive reference to the provisions invoked by the complainant imply that no other law (not even the defenses invoked by the defending party) can be considered? Surely not. The same reasoning applies to the references in the DSU to resort to WTO covered agreements. These references cannot be read as excluding all other law. Or does the law explicitly referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute preclude the Court's consideration and application of other rules of international law? It does not. The ICJ, like WTO panels, as a court under international law, regularly refers to law not explicitly mentioned in Article 38, in particular unilateral acts of states and acts of international organizations.
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WTO jurisprudence also confirms that the DSU, or any other WTO rule, should not be interpreted as limiting the applicable law before a WTO panel to WTO covered agreements. In practice, panels and the Appellate Body alike have frequently referred to and applied other rules of international law in examining WTO claims. They have done so not only in interpreting WTO covered agreements. 180 More important, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have applied other rules of international law independently of construing a given WTO provision. In their examination of WTO claims, they have applied rules of general international law, in particular on (1) issues of judicial dispute settlement (such as standing, 181 representation by private counsel, 182 la compétence de la compétence, 183 burden of proof, 184 the treatment of municipal law, 185 the acceptability of amicus curiae briefs, 186 authority to draw adverse inferences, 187 and judicial economy 188 ); (2) the law of treaties (such as the principle of nonretroactivity 189 ). In the absence of an inherent hierarchy of rules of international law (other than jus cogens), there is no reason to apply general international law, but not, for example, non-WTO treaties-always to the extent, of course, that both disputing parties are legally bound by them and it is done in the examination of WTO claims. 197 Finally, confirmation that the WTO judiciary does not apply only WTO covered agreements can be found in its repeated references to GATT/WTO jurisprudence and publicists. These sources do not, in and of themselves, represent rules of international law. However, as noted in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute (where they are mentioned as two of the five legal sources that the Court must "apply"), they are "subsidiary 198 See supra notes 173, 179. Article 291 of the LOS Convention, supra note 23, on "applicable law" is on point. The reference to "rules of international law not inconsistent with this Convention" does not amount to a general exclusion of all international law other than that in the Convention. It simply refers back to and confirms the conflict rules in Article 311 of the Convention. If Article 311 directs that a rule in the LOS Convention is to prevail over another rule, then Article 291 simply confirms that this should also be so in the judicial enforcement of the Convention rule, i.e., that the other rule ("inconsistent with this Convention") may not be applied over and above the Convention rule. 199 Bartels, supra note 175. 200 The immediate context of the relevant passage in Article 3.2 confirms this reading. The sentence directly follows the instruction for panels to clarify WTO covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law." This is a clear indication that the last sentence of Article 3.2 also deals with the interpretive function of panels.
means for the determination of rules of law." Clearly, if WTO panels and the Appellate Body were not allowed to refer to or apply any source of law other than WTO covered agreements, all of the WTO cases referenced above would be legally incorrect.
Under the DSU, should WTO rules always prevail? One might ask whether it is even possible, under international law, generally to limit the applicable law before an international court or tribunal. Of course, its jurisdiction can be limited and, depending on the claims, defenses, and facts of a specific case, the applicable law will also be narrowed down in a given dispute. But could a court of international law, generally and ex ante, exclude consideration of rules of international law other than those it was asked to enforce? I do not think so. Other international law can be excluded as a result of contracting out by the treaty or a general conflict clause in favor of the treaty.
198 However, such a contracting-out or conflict clause does not concern the potentially applicable law in settling disputes as much as which of several potentially applicable laws is to prevail.
A commentator has suggested that DSU Article 3.2, as confirmed in DSU Article 19.2, is this kind of general conflict clause in favor of WTO rules. 199 The last sentence of Aricle 3.2 provides: "Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." Article 19.2 states: "In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." Should these provisions be read as saying that WTO panels, the Appellate Body, and the DSB cannot ever add to or diminish the rights and obligations explicitly set out in WTO covered agreements? Do these provisions mean that no other law, be it pre-or post-1994, can ever influence WTO covered agreements and that, in the event of conflict between these agreements and another rule of international law, the WTO rule must always prevail? In my view, the answer is no. DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2 do not address the jurisdiction of panels, the applicable law before them, or the relationship between WTO covered agreements and all past and future law. Rather, they deal with the inherent limits a WTO panel must observe in interpreting WTO covered agreements. In exercising this judicial function of interpretation, WTO panels may clarify the meaning of WTO covered agreements, but they may not "add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." 200 To put it differently, as judicial organs, WTO panels may not create new rights and obligations; they must apply those that WTO members agreed to. Once again, this limitation on the function of WTO panels was made ex abundante cautela. Even without its enunciation, WTO panels would have been subject to it as an inherent limitation of the judicial function prescribed in general international law.
However, stating what the judiciary can do with the law differs greatly from stating what the legislature (i.e., WTO members) has done, or can do, with the law. Articles 3.2 and 19.2 specify that the WTO judiciary, like any other judiciary, cannot "change" the WTO treaty. A conflict clause, in contrast, would (1) tell us that WTO members, when negotiating the treaty, did not want any other existing rules of international law to prevail over the WTO treaty; and (2) direct WTO members that in their future dealings they must not change or overrule the rights and obligations in the WTO treaty (except pursuant to the amendment procedures and other provisions in the treaty itself). To make an analogy with the ICJ: the Statute prescribed in 1945 that the Court must "decide in accordance with international law"-a phrase interpreted in the South West Africa cases to mean that the ICJ's "duty is to apply the law as it finds it, not to make it." 201 This provision can hardly be interpreted to mean that the law the ICJ may look at is limited to that of 1945, nor that international law as it existed in 1945 must always and necessarily prevail over all subsequent rules of international law. The drafters of the WTO treaty could have inserted a conflict clause stating that the WTO treaty is to prevail over all past and future international law, similarly to Article 103 of the UN Charter. 202 Although such a clause would have had only limited effect, 203 the contractual freedom of WTO members would have permitted them to do so (within the limits of jus cogens and the principle of pacta tertiis). But if the drafters had wanted the WTO treaty to play the role of a second UN Charter, prevailing over all other law, would they not have said so? For example, would they not have put a nonderogation clause in the WTO Agreement itself, instead of twice inserting a sentence at the end of a provision on the interpretive function of WTO panels in a technical instrument, the DSU?
As further evidence of the proposition advanced here that WTO dispute settlement both encompasses more than WTO covered agreements (as well as more than interpreting these agreements in the light of other rules of international law 204 ) and does not include a general and automatic conflict clause in favor of WTO covered agreements, consider the following extreme example. Imagine that the WTO treaty included an agreement regulating the slave trade. Would a WTO panel be obliged to apply and enforce this agreement at the request of a WTO member complaining about trade restrictions regarding slaves imposed by another member? If the DSU were read as precluding reference to international law other than WTO covered agreements (i.e., as a mechanism created outside the system of international law) and/or as containing a conflict clause to the effect that WTO rules always prevail, a WTO panel would be so obliged. This example confirms the absurdity of portraying the DSU as some alien mechanism divorced from, and superior to, all other international law. Following the theory put forward in this paper, the defending party in our hypothetical dispute would be allowed to invoke Article 53 of the Vienna Convention as a legal defense against the WTO slave trade agreement (the applicable law for defenses not being inherently limited 205 ). Article 53 provides that "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." On that ground, the WTO panel would be obliged to find the WTO slave trade agreement invalid, hence inapplicable to and unenforceable against the WTO member in question. Nevertheless, given the limited jurisdiction of WTO panels (claims under WTO covered agreements only), the WTO member concerned could not itself bring a complaint to the WTO against the WTO member trading in slaves. 208 See text at notes 64-103 supra. 209 The general rule is that amendments should be adopted by consensus (WTO Agreement Art. X:1). However, if consensus is not reached, most amendments can be adopted by a two-thirds majority of WTO members (and others only upon acceptance by all WTO members) (Art. X:3-5).
Practical Consequences of the Approach Suggested Here
The worst case. At worst, the WTO rule is not enforced, and the WTO panel does not have jurisdiction to enforce the non-WTO rule. As seen, the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited. The applicable law before them is not. What is the practical result of allowing WTO defending parties to invoke other rules of international law, be they part of general international law or of non-WTO treaties? First, it should be stressed that a defending party can invoke only those rules by which both itself and the complaining party are bound. 207 The complaining party cannot see its WTO rights diminished on the basis of a rule of international law by which it is not bound. Second, as we have repeated more than once, other rules of international law, including post-1994 treaties, cannot form the legal basis of a WTO complaint. Claims can be brought only under WTO covered agreements.
Within these limits, however, the practical consequences of a defending party's ability to invoke, for example, a rule of customary law, or an environmental or human rights convention or bilateral treaty to which both disputing parties are bound, in its defense against a WTO claim, must be determined by the relevant conflict rules referred to earlier.
208 These rules may be spelled out in the WTO treaty itself, the treaty from which the contradictory rule derives, or general international law. If the relevant conflict rule indicates that the WTO rule in question prevails over the conflicting norm of international law, the WTO rule must be applied (and the complainant wins). If, in contrast, the relevant conflict rule demonstrates that the other rule of international law overrides or even invalidates the WTO rule, then the WTO rule cannot be applied (and the defendant wins), irrespective of whether the WTO treaty itself includes an exception or justification for the measure at hand. The latter case, however, does not result in requiring the WTO panel to judicially enforce the other rule of international law (say, the contradictory environmental norm). A WTO panel can only enforce claims under WTO covered agreements. To be able to enforce these other rules, a WTO panel would need expanded jurisdiction. Recalling the two levels at which WTO covered agreements operate (the general level of the entire corpus of international law, and the more concrete level of WTO dispute settlement), we can conclude that what has been taken away or overruled at the first level can no longer be enforced at the second level (i.e., a WTO rule that has been terminated or overruled under international law can no longer be enforced in WTO dispute settlement). What WTO members themselves have taken out of WTO covered agreements at the first level cannot be put back by a WTO panel in the second level. For a panel to do so anyway would amount to (using the words of DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2) "adding" to obligations of the defendant that, pursuant to other rules of international law and the way they interact with WTO rules, no longer exist. If a panel follows the approach suggested here and dis-applies the WTO rule in these circumstances, the panel would not be "diminishing" the rights of the complainant. Rather, the complaining WTO member would have done so by agreeing to the conflicting non-WTO rule in the first place. Thus, the WTO panel would not create law but merely give effect to law created elsewhere by the WTO member itself. On the other hand, for claims under these non-WTO rules to filter through to the second level of WTO dispute resolution, an express intention to expand the jurisdiction of WTO panels would be required.
Is to take cognizance of non-WTO rules as part of a defense, especially rules binding on only the disputing parties, contravenes WTO amendment procedures and threatens the uniformity of WTO law. This reasoning implies, however, that the WTO treaty is an island created and existing outside the sphere of international law. One of the main objectives of this paper was to show that it is not. Thus, the WTO treaty can be affected by amendment, but also by the conclusion of other treaties or the existence or emergence of other rules of international law pursuant to, for example, the rules in the Vienna Convention on the application of successive treaties (Art. 30), inter se modifications (Art. 41), and treaty interpretation (Art. 31(3)(c)). 210 The WTO treaty did not contract out of these general international law rules on the interplay of norms, let alone the system of international law. Hence, these rules must apply to the WTO treaty. The WTO treaty changed the 1994 landscape of international law, but post-1994 treaties can also change this landscape, including the legal relationships between WTO members in the WTO. International law does not comprehend inherent hierarchies of norms; nor does it require an acte contraire for a norm to be affected by another one. 211 Moreover, if WTO members could affect the WTO treaty only through formal amendment (i.e., if the WTO were in essence a separate legal system like domestic or, to some extent, EC law), it would basically mean that every act in the trade relationship between WTO members would be regulated exclusively and eternally by the 1994 provisions of the WTO treaty unless a consensus of WTO members decided otherwise. Ironically, this immobility in the WTO would simply increase together with WTO membership. Indeed, the more WTO members there are, the more difficult it becomes to muster a consensus for formally amending WTO rules. 212 The WTO would become more than a collection of rules "written in stone"; it would also be transformed into a "safe haven" for WTO members wanting to backtrack on obligations entered into elsewhere.
The effect of the approach suggested here, that WTO rules would apply differently to different WTO members depending on whether or not they have accepted other non-WTO rules, may complicate the matrix of rights and obligations between WTO members. But this is an unavoidable consequence of not having a centralized legislator in international law.
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In addition, from a practical point of view, should we expect-in our complex world with 141 WTO members of widely diverging interests-each and every WTO member to bear the same obligations vis-à-vis each and every other WTO member? Surely not. Still, this consequence would ensue if formal amendments were required as a prerequisite to affecting the WTO treaty. 214 The WTO seeks to promote nondiscrimination and trade liberalization in the context of regulatory diversity. Unlike the European Community, for example, it does not generally extend its reach to harmonization in nontrade matters in pursuit of some sort of federation of nation-states. Finally, giving effect to non-WTO rules as suggested here must be distinguished from interpreting the WTO treaty differently depending on the disputing WTO members involved. In my view, the latter is not allowed and would definitely threaten the uniformity of WTO law. This issue is explored below, but first we take a closer look at certain WTO disputes in the light of the theory advanced in this paper.
Certain past disputes in the light of the theory presented here. WTO panels have sometimes been asked to judicially enforce pre-1994 GATT instruments that were not included in WTO The arbitrators in EC-Hormones faced a similar problem. The United States claimed autonomous beef quota rights on the basis of bilateral U.S.-EC agreements not incorporated in WTO covered agreements. The arbitrators repeated what was said in EC-Poultry, namely, that the bilateral agreements do not set out "rights under any of the WTO agreements covered by the DSU" and that "[t]he rights thus alleged are derived from bilateral agreements that cannot be properly enforced on their own in WTO dispute settlement."
217 But if, in these two disputes, (1) the bilateral agreement had been invoked as a defense (not a claim); (2) the relationship between the bilateral agreement and the relevant GATT rules had not been addressed in the WTO treaty; and (3) pursuant to conflict rules of international law, the bilateral agreement would prevail over the GATT rule, under the theory presented here the bilateral agreement could operate as a valid defense dis-applying the relevant WTO rule allegedly violated by the defendant. However, as invoked in both of these disputes (as part of a claim), the theory here supports the outcome.
In Argentina-Footwear, the Appellate Body examined whether a 3 percent statistical tax found by the panel to be violative of GATT Article VIII could be excused by means of an allegedly conflicting obligation imposed on Argentina in a memorandum of understanding it had concluded with the IMF. This memorandum stated that the fiscal measures to be adopted by Argentina include "increases in import duties, including a temporary 3 per cent surcharge on imports." The Appellate Body found that on the basis of the record before the panel, it did "not appear possible to determine the precise legal nature of this Memorandum." 218 223 Id. 224 Id., paras. 124-25. It is unclear whether the European Community referred to the "precautionary principle" either (1) as an element to be looked at in the interpretation of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement; or (2) as a non-WTO rule of international law in defense of a violation of Article 5. Although the former seems more accurate (the Community was claiming that because its measures were precautionary in nature, they satisfied the requirements of Article 5), the latter hypothesis is more interesting and is the one we further examine in this paper. the GATT 1994." 220 The Appellate Body found that only the Declaration on the Relationship of the WTO with the IMF-a ministerial decision that constitutes part of the WTO Final Act, but not part of WTO covered agreements-says anything about the legal relationship between the WTO and the IMF. This declaration states, in essence, that the relationship between WTO and IMF rules regarding trade in goods shall continue to be governed by provisions of GATT 1947, which means that only the exceptions provided for in these provisions for IMF-related measures can be used to justify GATT violations. On the basis of this conflict rule, the Appellate Body found that since no IMF-related exceptions under GATT Article VIII are to be found in the GATT itself, independent IMF rules, such as the memorandum in question, could not justify Argentina's violation of GATT Article VIII. 221 If the Appellate Body had thought that the IMF memorandum could not possibly cure the violation of GATT Article VIII simply because the memorandum is not part of WTO covered agreements, it could have said so. But it did not. Rather, it assessed whether the IMF memorandum conflicts with GATT rules and considered which of the two rules should prevail in case a conflict arises. The conclusion reached is fully warranted and supports the thesis presented in this paper. The Appellate Body did not limit its examination to WTO covered agreements. It looked beyond those agreements and also took account of both IMF rules and the Declaration on the Relationship of the WTO with the IMF, a legal instrument not included in WTO covered agreements. This declaration contains an explicit conflict clause in favor of GATT rules. But if the allegedly conflicting rule were not an IMF rule, but one found, for example, in an environmental convention binding on both parties, how should the Appellate Body react? Under the theory suggested here, as in Argentina-Footwear, it should not confine itself to the WTO covered agreements but apply the environmental rule as a possible defense and in the event of conflict between it and WTO rules (say, GATT Articles III and XX), apply the relevant conflict rules of general international law (in the absence of any treaty-based conflict rules). Should the applicable conflict rule determine that the environmental rule prevails (e.g., as lex specialis), the Appellate Body would then be obliged not to apply the contradictory WTO rule and the complainant would lose. However, it would not have jurisdiction to hear claims of violation of the environmental rule.
In EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body was faced with an EC claim that the so-called precautionary principle constitutes customary international law, or at least a general principle of law. The Appellate Body found that it was "unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for [it] in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question." 222 It noted, though, that "the precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation." 223 It further remarked that "the principle has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in particular provisions of that Agreement." Nevertheless, it recognized that the principle "finds reflection" in several SPS provisions. Noting that "the precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal . . . principles of treaty interpretation," the Appellate Body finally agreed with the panel that "the precautionary principle does not override the provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement." 224 In my view, this outcome is fully justified. But not so the legal reasoning.
